This paper shows that two-speed monetary unification carries a danger. Low-inflation countries in Europe have an interest in delaying entry of the high-inflation country because it would raise the average inflation rate. However, this country might refuse to join, when the first group find it qualified to, that is when convergence has taken place. This is because the high-inflation country can employ its monetary policy to stabilize against shocks given that the currency union members have optimally chosen a lower inflation rate. Hence, a tradeoff exists between the necessity for convergence and the free-rider problem.
Introduction
This paper examines a free-rider problem that may arise in the European monetary unification process. Although the paper focuses on stylized models, this analysis is motivated by the debate among European countries over monetary unification sequencing and more specifically the Maastricht treaty for a two-speed monetary unification (henceforth TSMU). Low-inflation countries (in particular Netherlands and Germany) are concerned that the presence of countries from Southern Europe will impose an inflation bias on the future European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy in particular because of their large budget deficits and debt to GDP ratios. This concern has led them to propose a two-stage approach to monetary union. TSMU has now become a central question in the European debate specially after the monetary and political crises of September 1992 and August 1993.
The Maastricht treaty (see articles 109F-H) institutes a regular reporting procedure for the European Monetary Institute and the Commission on the EC's readiness for phase three of monetary unification (the creation of the ECB and the single currency). They will consider whether member countries meet four criteria of economic convergence:
an inflation rate within 1; percentage points of the average of the three EC's lowest; a budget deficit that is not excessive (a deficit/GDP ratio below 3% and a debt/GDP ratio below 60%); a currency that has not been devalued within the European monetary system for two years; and long-term interest rates no more than two points above the three EC's lowest levels. Not later than 31 December 1996 the European Council will decide, by qualified majority, whether a majority of member states fulfills the necessary conditions to join the currency union, the rate at which their currencies should be fixed and what special arrangements should be made for those countries left out of the final phase. The voting rights of the countries not included in the final phase would be suspended. They would be able to join later only if a qualified majority of the Member States agreed. This paper shows that such a sequencing approach carries a danger, because it may create an incentive for one country not to join the ECB. ' A similar problem was recognized by Casella (1992) in a context that focused on the incentive for small countries to deviate from cooperative agreements. The main focus of this paper concerns the consequences of the sequencing approach to monetary unification on the free-rider problem. In the model, low-inflation countries will not invite the high-inflation country before the period when the high-inflation country has sufficiently diminished its inflation bias or, equivalently, sufficiently converged. However, a waiting period which is too long might be harmful because of the ' Alesina and Grilli (1993) look at a related danger induced by TSMU, namely that the ECB countries would never admit the countries that stayed outside.
free-rider problem that emerges when the high-inflation country has converged. Hence, a tradeoff exists between the necessity for convergence on one hand and the free-rider problem on the other hand.
The model used in this paper extends the analysis of Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Barro and Gordon (1983a, b) , Rogoff (1985) and Alesina and Grilli (1991) to include a spillover effect between the different countries in Europe. As in some of these papers, central banks in the model can accommodate supply shocks with inflationary policies, because the policy is set after a stochastic supply shock is observed and contracts on wages are formed. This creates a typical time inconsistency problem characterized by sub-optimal high inflation because the central bank of the high-inflation country wants a higher level of employment than the wage setters. The latter, therefore, set the wage purposely high.
Each central bank in this model has a further incentive to conduct inflationary policies because multinational firms increase output in countries that have relatively lower real wages. This modelling of the interdependence of the EC on the supply side is novel and implies that countries compete for job creation and try to displace employment.
This extension of the traditional Barro-Gordon model produces an externality that is not taken into account by the national central bankers in Europe. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient and characterized by an 'external' inflationary bias, because national central bankers do not take into account the European aggregate slope of the Phillips curve. Hence, in this model the benefits of monetary union rest on both discipline and cooperation gains because governments care only about short-run stabilization and inflation. This paper can be viewed as an attempt to bring together two branches of the theoretical literature on European monetary integration. One branch studies solutions to internal credibility problems that can be resolved through institutional agreements such as the EMS (see for example Giavazzi and Pagan0 (1988) ). The second branch mainly focusses on spillover effects of monetary policies and the gains from international cooperation (see for example Henderson (1988, 1991) ).
Once a ECB is created, with credibly fixed exchange-rates, the countries participating in it will optimally diminish their reaction to shocks. This allows a country that was not admitted to participate in the ECB to import employment from the ECB countries when negative supply shocks occur by setting a higher inflation rate than the ECB countries. Once it is considered qualified to join, one country might have an incentive to free-ride the ECB if the credibility gains (the reduction of inflation expectations) from joining the ECB are outweighed by the stabilization gains from employment transfers when shocks occur.
Section 2 describes the economic model used in the paper. Section 3 derives the optimal monetary policies in the case of flexible exchange rates, a full ECB and a partial ECB. Section 4 examines the determinants of the choice of the monetary regime in Europe. Section 5 analyses the tradeoff between the convergence necessity and the free-rider danger.
The economic model
The model consists of three countries. There are two identical low-inflation countries (denoted L, and L2) and one high-inflation country (denoted HI. The size of the high-inflation country is p. The size of each of the identical low-inflation countries is t(l -p), so that the size of Europe is normalized to 1.
The higher inflation rate existing in the high-inflation country is caused by two different reasons: the first one is a fiscal bias and refers to the public finance theory of inflation. Unlike the low-inflation countries, the optimal inflation rate for the high-inflation country is not zero but Fr. This assumption captures the argument that, because of lower tax bases (due for example to large underground sectors: see Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) ), seignorage is part of an efficient tax package for some southern European countries. The optimal inflation tax in the high-inflation country could also be higher than in the other European countries if it starts out with a higher ratio of debt to GDP.
The second one is a political bias and refers to a difference between the central banker's employment target and the natural level of employment. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no difference between the central banker's employment target and the natural level of employment in the low inflation countries. This assumption captures differences in the levels of distortions in Europe and is similar to assumptions made in Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1988) . The conflict in the high-inflation country between the central bank and the wage setters over the level of employment could be due either to distortion effects of tax evasion or high income taxes; see Barro and Gordon (1983a) . Suppose that the difference between the low-and high-inflation countries in the optimal inflation rate is partially due to differences in the size of the underground sectors. Also assume that tax evasion consumes real resources. Then, that same difference in the underground sectors would both produce different optimal inflation rates and different wedges between the socially optimal and natural rates of production. Similar results would obtain if tax collection costs were higher in the high-inflation country. Finally, both the optimal inflation rate and the income tax rate (and therefore induced distortions) would be higher in the high-inflation country if it starts out with a higher debt to GDP ratio. Hence, in these interpretations, the fiscal and political bias are related.
The next question to examine is how these biases evolve with time. The structure of the economy of the high-inflation country is assumed to converge to the level of the low-inflation countries. This means that the economic factors that differ between European countries, the importance of the underground sector or the ratio of debt to GDP, converge with time to the low-inflation countries level.
Hence, we assume that St decreases with time and is not influenced by government policies:
(1) where %a is the optimal level of inflation for the high-inflation country in period zero when the ECB is put in place ' and p is the speed of convergence of this fiscal bias. The evolution of the political bias j, follows the same pattern: jj, = jOe-p' (2) where 7" is the per capita difference between the socially optimal level of output and the natural level of output at time 0 for the high-inflation country. Without loss of generality, the natural level of output is chosen to be zero in both countries. As we have interpreted the fiscal and political biases to be related, we assume that they converge at the same speed /L.
Suppose both biases are caused by the existence of an important underground sector. The decrease of Z, and J, over time means in this case that the underground sector in the high-inflation country becomes less significant over time.
If we interpret both biases to be caused by a high initial level of the debt to GDP ratio in the high-inflation country, then their decrease over time means that because this ratio diminishes over time, both the optimal inflation rate and the income tax rate (and therefore the induced distortions) decrease over time. In the limit, European countries are identical in all respects except possibly for their size.
The welfare loss function for the high-inflation country is given by
where p is the rate of time preference of the policy maker, 7rlH is the log of inflation rate and yp ' 1s the log of domestic output. All output levels are given in per-capita terms. p is the relative weight that the central bank places on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Lr is the loss function at time t.
The loss function for the two identical low-inflation countries is given by
The supply functions, in per-capita terms, of the high-inflation country and of the low-inflation countries L, and L, are characterized by the following equations:
where W, is the log of the wage rate, pt is the log of the price level and E, is a productivity shock distributed N(0, a,> and common to the three countries. 3
The first term in the supply functions, the domestic real wage, is the standard part of the Barro-Gordon framework. The second and third terms of this equation, both foreign real wages, constitute a novel element and capture interdependence in the EC on the supply side. They can be explained in the following way: imagine a firm that has plants in the three European countries and has to decide where to increase or decrease its labor demand and its production. The second and third terms in Eqs. (5a), (5b), and (SC) imply that this multinational will choose to increase labor demand and production relatively more in the country that has a lower real wage. This creates an incentive .for each government to inflate the domestic real wage away to import jobs when faced with a negative supply shock.
Note that we have chosen coefficients on the supply function such that in a flexible exchange rate regime the Phillips curve of an individual country will be positively sloped. However, the Phillips curve is vertical for European countries as a group. 4 A more general setting, with a positively sloped Phillips curve at the European level, could have been assumed without changing the main results of this paper. The important idea behind the setting is that, when countries compete over employment, the slope of the aggregate European Phillips curve is less than at the national level. This would be the case in any model where firms base their choice of location of production on international comparisons of real wages. ' The coefficients in front of real wages of each country reflect their relative size. If countries were of identical size ( p = l/3), the supply functions would be identical. For a small country, the transfer of output from the rest of Europe, if it has a lower real wage, is larger than for a large country when measured in per-capita terms. This is because for a small country any differential in real wage will involve a large area (the rest of Europe). For a large country, the differential in real wage will involve a small area, as by definition, the real wage must be identical inside a country. Hence, the slope of the Phillips curve at the national level will be different for countries of different size. 6
Wage-setters in all countries want to achieve the equilibrium output yI. Their utility can be represented by
The expected utility-maximizing strategy for wage setters at any time t is thus
where pf is the expected price level in country i. Hence, output can be rewritten as
where r;' is the expected inflation rate in country i. Output in L, is symmetric to output in L,.
Optimal monetary policies and welfare analysis
There are two games in the model. The first one concerns monetary policies. This game depends only on the institutional structure (known at the beginning of each period t>, that is whether there is a ECB or not, and if there is an ECB how many countries joined it. The second game concerns the institutional structure itself and involves the decision of whether and when to invite a country to join the ECB and whether to accept this invitation.
This section describes the Nash equilibria of the first game for each institutional structure.
The equilibrium without a European Central Bank
It is assumed that each central bank perfectly controls the domestic inflation rate. Hence, for simplicity, in the case of the current EMS, a realignment is implicitly assumed to take place after each shock and the outcome is similar to the one under flexible exchange rates. The game is identical in each period and the optimal monetary policies in period t only depend on the institutional structure at the beginning of period t.
Once the institutional structure is known, inflation expectations are formed and wage contracts are set. Then, the shock E, is realized and observed by the three central banks which choose the domestic inflation rate based upon this information.
The problem of the central bank of country i is to minimize its instantaneous loss function 7 with respect to the domestic inflation rate T: taking as given the domestic expected inflation rate of' and the expected and actual inflation rates T/' and T/ of countries j # i.
In equilibrium the expected inflation rates in period t are:
where the subscript FER is for flexible exchange rates. Each central bank has an incentive to set a higher (lower) inflation rate than the other European countries when a negative (positive) shock is observed. In addition, the central bank of the high-inflation country wants a higher level of employment than the wage setters. Hence, as wage setters understand both incentives, they will set the wage purposely high in the high-inflation country. Solving for the reaction functions, the time consistent inflation policies and the output levels are:
where cx = p/(1 -p). (Y is the size of the high-inflation country relative to the rest of Europe. We will assume in the rest of the paper that the high-inflation country is smaller than the rest of Europe, so that LY is less than 1. If all countries are of the same size ((Y = t>, the reaction to shocks is identical and in equilibrium there is no net employment transfer because each country tries similarly to counter the shock by transferring it to its partners. However, if for example the high-inflation country is relatively small (a < i), then in equilibrium this country will be able to stabilize its output by transferring part of the shock to its partners. 8 Hence, ' In a given institutional structure, the optimal choice of inflation rates is identical whether policy-makers minimize the instantaneous or the infinite horizon loss function, as the game is identical for each period and we have not considered trigger mechanisms.
s See Martin (1994) , for a similar result on the relation between size of countries and their monetary policies in a model with seigniorage competition. in this model, output variability will' depend on the size of the country. Smaller countries will have less variable output (ayr/& is of the same sign as E,) than large countries.
Expected welfare loss levels at time t in the flexible exchange rate regime are: Compared to the efficient solution produced by the ECB equilibrium described in the following section, the flexible exchange rates regime is characterized by an average positive inflation rate proportional to j;, in the high-inflation country, and an overreaction to shocks in all countries. This is because the Central Banks have no credible way of precommitting to wage setters and to each other to the efficient inflation rate.
A three-country European Central Bank
It is assumed that members of the ECB are irrevocably committed to the union once they have joined it. In this case, if every one joins, both the wage setters and the policymakers know that the inflation rate must be identical in all countries. So, Eq. (8) becomes y,"=y;=+
If a full ECB is created, we assume that countries' weight in the European social loss function minimized by the ECB is equal to their respective size. Hence, this social loss function is L ECBr = "LH,CB, + LL,CB,.
(14)
The inflation rates and expected welfare loss levels at time t are then:
where the subscript ECB stands for a three-country ECB. 
Comparing the equilibria with and without ECB produces the following conclusions:
-The positive average inflation rate of the high-inflation country is eliminated in the ECB case, because wage setters understand that national policy makers have no incentive to inflate away the real wage in this new institutional setting, and reduce their inflation expectations. -There is no attempt to react to shocks in the ECB case, as governments do not try to accommodate shocks by displacing employment between countries.
-The fiscal bias of the high-inflation country enters now as a cost for all countries in the ECB. For the high-inflation country, the European inflation rate is short of its optimal rate Zt. For the low-inflation countries on the contrary, the European inflation rate is too high because of the political influence given to the high-inflation country.
A two-country European Central Bank
We now examine the optimal policies in the case where the high-inflation country remains outside of the currency union created by the two low-inflation countries. We compute the level of the loss function of the high-inflation country if its exchange rate is flexible. In the case in which the high-inflation country does not join the ECB, its problem in each period t is described by minGc,*, = (&a21 -sJ2 + P [ GXU1 -He
7TECB21
-(&a21 -Le
with respect to rrEcB2(,
where the subscript ECB2 stands for the institutional situation of a two-member ECB.
The two-country ECB solves the following problem in any period t: 
Deriving the reaction functions of the three countries and solving for equilibrium, we get the following time consistent inflation policies at time t:
The output levels are:
Output in the country outside the ECB varies less than in the flexible exchange rate regime. We derive the respective net per-capita transfers of output (NTH and NTL):
1 +p+ a2/3er.
For the net transfer to have a stabilizing effect on domestic output, its sign must be opposite to that of the domestic shock. This will be the case for the high-inflation country as we have assumed that (Y is less than 1.
Hence output in the outside country is less than E, in absolute value. The intuition for this result is the following: if two countries join the union they will not set their common inflation rate to zero because they still try to export unemployment to the non ECB country when hit by a negative shock. However, their optimal policy is characterized by a lower response to supply shocks than in the non ECB structure. This is because the marginal benefit of inflation is lower than in the non-ECB equilibrium as the virtual employment transfer can be imposed on only one country and has to be divided by the two ECB countries. Hence, the slope of the Phillips curve has become more vertical for these countries. The optimal policy for the high-inflation country is to react more to shocks than ECB countries as it is smaller than the two ECB countries combined. When the two low-inflation countries create the ECB, they act as if they had become a large country. The high-inflation country can therefore 'free-ride' in the sense that it takes advantage of its small size relative to the common inflation rate zone of the ECB.
The expected levels of welfare loss are:
In sum, the creation of a partial ECB will affect the monetary policies and welfare of the country that is excluded from this institution.
The determinants of the choice of the monetary regime in Europe
The structure of the game played between low-and high-inflation countries over the choice of the institutional arrangement is asymmetric. The low-inflation countries decide if and when to admit the high-inflation country, but they cannot force the high-inflation country to enter. The high-inflation country's only choice is between accepting and refusing the invitation to enter once it is made. This is the way we characterize TSMU. Table 1 summarizes the expected welfare loss levels for each country at any time 1. These are instantaneous levels of welfare loss and they therefore vary with time as +* and y, converge to zero.
It can be checked that LkERr > Lkc,,, and that LFER, > LEcB2, at any time t. Hence, the flexible exchange rate regime equilibrium can never be a Nash equilibrium. This regime, for all countries and at any time t, is dominated by the equilibrium in which the high-inflation country does not participate in the ECB created by the two low-inflation countries. Hence, the important institutional equilibria to consider are the two top ones in Table 1 .
We now examine the costs and benefits for all countries of these two equilibria as they will also determine the decision about the timing of entry of the high-inflation country. As long as the fiscal bias of the high-inflation country, ?rt, is sufficiently large relative to the variance of the shocks a,, the low-inflation countries have an incentive to delay entry of the high-inflation country: the inflation cost of integrating this country will be higher than the gains from cooperation on reaction to shocks. The high-inflation country's relative size does not play an obvious role in the decision of the low-inflation countries. If small, its power inside the ECB will imply a common inflation rate close to the one desired by the low-inflation countries. Further, the transfer of output to the high-inflation country will also be small if this country is not in the ECB. Finally, whatever this country's size, the more the low-inflation countries care about inflation (the lower p) the more they will prefer to exclude the high-inflation country. If a; is sufficiently large relative to y, and Zr and (Y is small, then a free-rider problem can arise and the high-inflation country may refuse the invitation to join the ECB: this country may benefit at the expense of the other two. The effect of p on the choice to accept the invitation to join the ECB is ambiguous. A large p implies that output stabilization allowed by the free-rider position is highly valued. But the credibility cost of not joining the ECB will also be large.
Hence, the choice between free-riding and joining depends on a tradeoff between (i> the combined gains in credibility towards wage setters and in cooperation in the ECB equilibrium, and (ii) the expected gains in stabilization in the free-rider equilibrium.
The free-rider incentive might be affected by other elements that are not modelled here and are present in the Optimum Currency Area literature. Two important factors are transaction costs and imperfect correlation between shocks. The two have opposite effects on the incentive to enter the ECB. Transaction costs elimination in a currency union should diminish the free-rider incentive and also make low-inflation countries more willing to invite the high-inflation country to join.
However, if shocks are not perfectly correlated, the incentive to stay out of the ECB will increase for high inflation countries. Low-inflation countries will also be less willing to accept the high-inflation country. With imperfect correlation, the ECB equilibrium no longer coincides with the cooperative equilibrium.
Specifically, the ability to stabilize output by transferring shocks abroad increases in the flexible exchange rate regime. This is because, on average, countries do not need to react as much to imperfectly correlated shocks. Hence, the inefficiency of a partial ECB relative to a full one decreases. This result is consistent with that of the Optimum Currency Area literature: with perfectly correlated shocks, the exchange rate instrument is less valuable for stabilization purposes, thus lowering the costs of surrendering the instrument.
The appendix derives the inflation rates and welfare levels when shocks are not identical across countries. It is shown that the ability for the outside country to take advantage of its relative size decreases with the correlation of shocks. However, this ability is still there: the country may still exploit its small size relative to the other two to gain special stabilization benefits. Therefore, by focusing on the case of perfect correlation of the shocks, we do not distort the issue, but simply focus on the case where our argument is strongest.
The net impact of the elimination of transaction costs and imperfect correlation of the shocks on the decision to form an ECB depends ultimately on which set of countries in Europe qualifies as an optimal currency area.
These results also highlight the plurality of reasons that may motivate a country to join the ECB '. Some countries (such as Germany) will want to join the ECB primarily because it allows them to cooperate on monetary policies in response to shocks. Other countries (such as Italy) will want to enter the ECB, in the short term, primarily because it will help them affect credibly the private sector's expectations. The model also shows how the nature of the gains from European monetary integration is changing over time. It is evolving from a institutional agreement that helps decrease the high average inflation rate (the discipline phase which affects wage setters' expectations) into an agreement where gains come mainly from international cooperation (the cooperative phase).
Finally, the model shows that inflation rates may not be good indicators of convergence. Even though the fiscal and political biases (Yrt and Jt) converge to zero (i.e. the economies converge to an identical structure), the inflation rates of the ECB countries and of the non-ECB country will never converge to the same rate even if countries were identical in size. Eq. (18) shows that the mean of the inflation rates nzcBZr and ni,-aXt converges. However, the monetary policy of the free-rider country will always accommodate shocks more strongly than the ECB countries. lo In this sense, strict convergence could never occur between ECB and non-ECB countries.
Convergence and the timing of two-speed monetary unification
We show in this section that the long-term institutional equilibrium in Europe depends critically on the relation between convergence and the free-rider problem. Low-inflation countries will favor a high degree of convergence because this allows them to integrate the high-inflation country with a minimum short-term cost. However, a high degree of convergence at the time when the high-inflation country is invited to join the ECB may induce this country to free-ride the ECB.
To examine the German argument in favor of convergence, we impose the assumption that the integration of the high-inflation country will be so costly at the time the integration process starts (because of the high level of Zo>, that the advantages of full integration (the absence of employment transfers to a foreign country) will be outweighed by its costs (the inflation cost imposed by the high-inflation country). For TSMU to have interesting policy implications in our xoint was made, although in the context of the EMS, by Melitz (1988) . lo Moreover, the mean inflation rates would not converge if all countries were converging to an identical structure characterized by a positive y. framework, a conflict must be present between the two groups of countries. Hence, we assume, realistically, that the high-inflation country initially wants to enter the ECB, presumably because of a large initial political bias. Beginning at time 0, the optimal institutional equilibrium for low-inflation countries is a partial ECB excluding the high-inflation country. Low-inflation countries are left with a question of timing: when should they invite the high-inflation country to enter? Their first-best strategy is to minimize their social loss function over an infinite horizon and choose T, the time at which they will invite the high-inflation country, accordingly. From 0 to T, they form a partial ECB. After T, the ECB includes all three countries. Hence, their problem is:
with respect to T and Ta 0.
T (22)
This is the same as choosing T such that, at T, the welfare levels with a three-country ECB and a full ECB are equal:
Solving for T, we find with:
with
T 2 0 (24)
This expression is positive since LY < 1: this means that the low-inflation countries will at some point be better off with the high-inflation country inside the ECB.
As shown by Eq. (24), the delay of entry of the high-inflation country will be the longer the lower the rate of convergence p, the higher the initial fiscal bias, the lower the variance of shocks o-E2 and the more countries care about inflation, that is the lower /3 is. For the same reasons as those explained in Section 4, the effect of (Y on T is ambiguous.
However, low-inflation countries must also take into account the optimal strategy of the high-inflation country. This country's only choice is whether to join or not the ECB once the offer of the low-inflation countries to enter the ECB has been made. When deciding over its best strategy, the high-inflation country takes into account that if it accepts to enter the ECB, this constitutes an irrevocable choice. On the other hand, if it does not accept the invitation to enter at a certain period, it can always accept it later. We define T * as the date at which the high-inflation country is indifferent between joining the ECB and staying outside. Hence, T * solves the following equality: / m / co e-P*L&zrdt = e-p'L&,dt.
T' T'
Solving for T * we find P2~,2-w(1+~))2% 
We will focus on the most interesting situation in which the free-rider problem has a consequence on the timing of TSMU: when a free-rider incentive eventually arises, and the high-inflation country would initially choose to enter the ECB. In this case, we have
The first inequality says that a free-riding incentive exists when countries have converged. The second inequality expresses the assumption that at t = 0, the high-inflation country would have accepted to enter the ECB. Hence, T * is positive and defines the point at which the high-inflation country will no longer choose to accept an invitation to enter the ECB. T * > 0 will occur if the initial fiscal bias is small relative to the initial political bias, the convergence of the economy is low and the discount rate is high. Though the high-inflation country wants initially to enter the ECB (even though this implies renouncing forever to the gains of free-riding) because of large (short-term) credibility gains when inside the ECB, these credibility gains fade as the country's inflation abates. That makes possible the occurrence of T * .
Given the possibility of T * , the low-inflation countries must take into account the optimal strategy of the high-inflation country when deciding when to invite the high-inflation country.
If T * > T, then low-inflation countries can achieve their first best. They will invite the high-inflation country when they would independently prefer to do so.
This will happen if the convergence rate and the initial inflation bias are relatively low and the initial political bias and the discount rate are high. If T * < T, then the free-rider problem may modify the low-inflation countries' decision. In this case, these countries may find that their only way to induce the high-inflation country to accept their invitation to join them is to offer the latter entry just prior to T * . Hence, solving the long-run free-rider problem obliges them to soften their requirement for convergence. They will do so if solving the free-rider problem gives them a higher level of welfare than having a partial ECB forever, that is if If condition 1 is satisfied, the free-rider incentive dictates the optimal timing of TSMU for low-inflation countries. Condition 1 will be satisfied in particular for low discount rates. I1 If condition 1 is not satisfied, the low-inflation countries have no incentive to solve the free-rider problem by weakening the convergence criteria. An ECB with all European countries will never exist. This would be so if the free-rider incentive is strong and/or the fiscal bias is large. l2
Of course, if a free-rider incentive does not exist when economies have converged (i.e. the expression in Eq. (28) is negative), then the high-inflation country would always accept the invitation to enter and the low-inflation countries can achieve their first best. This would be true if the initial fiscal bias is low and if the size of the high-inflation country is large enough. These results imply that it would be dangerous to consider the timing of TSMU as a way for low-inflation countries to achieve their first best. Waiting until the high-inflation country has sufficiently converged so that its entry imposes minimum costs on the low-inflation countries may be a risky strategy. The timing of TSMU should also take into account the incentives of the outside country. Otherwise this could produce an inefficient equilibrium for low and high inflation countries alike, because a full-ECB would never emerge. This also suggests that if policymakers in the low-inflation countries are uncertain of the high-inflation country's incentives (for example because the speed of convergence of the economy, the fiscal and political bias are not public information), then they should " One set of coefficients for which the free-rider incentive arises in this fashion is the following: y,=?r,=10, UC*= p = p = 1; p = 3, a = 0.1. For these parameters, T = 0.308 and T * = 0.0348. '* This equilibrium might be improved if the sharing of the voting power in the ECB was more flexible. In the model, the weights given to each country in the ECB are proportional to their size. However, we could also have followed the approach of Casella (1989) . In her model, small countries will obtain more than proportional power in the agreement. A similar approach would lead to the offer of less than proportional power to the high-inflation country when the ECB is created and, the gradual augmentation of their voting power as convergence took place. The share of the voting power should be such that the high-inflation country has no long-run advantage in free-riding. Such an approach would strengthen the case against strict convergence criteria with a long waiting period. err towards requiring less rather than more convergence.
Under uncertainty, miscalculations neglecting the free-rider problem might endanger the whole process of monetary unification.
Conclusion
This paper has examined some of the implications of TSMU and has shown that the creation of a partial ECB will affect the monetary policies and incentives of those countries that are excluded from this institution. This was done in a model where monetary policy serves to displace employment because multinational firms increase output in those countries which have relatively lower real wages. The results of the model are the following:
First, inflation rates are not good indicators of economic convergence. In the model, even if countries converge to the same economic structure, inflation rates of ECB and non ECB countries do not converge because the latter lack the inflation discipline of a fixed exchange rate regime. As long as one country stays outside the monetary union, even if this country should become perfectly like the rest, it will behave differently. Thus perfect convergence, in particular in terms of inflation rates will never occur. Hence, union members should not adopt perfect convergence as a criterion for admission.
Second, if a free-rider problem emerges when countries have sufficiently converged, then it may determine the optimal time path of TSMU. A high degree of convergence before the high-inflation country is integrated in the ECB is not optimal. The ECB members should offer admission while convergence is lower than they would prefer if they could determine the outcome. Otherwise, Europe might be stuck in the long run with a partial ECB even though a full ECB is optimal. The output levels are: Hence, for a given level of variance of shocks, both more stable inflation rates and output levels will be achieved when shocks are not perfectly correlated. To assess the impact of the degree of correlation of shocks on the free-rider incentive we derive the net per-capita transfer of output (NTH and NTL> in ('4.3) For the net transfer to have a stabilizing effect on domestic output it must be of opposite sign of the domestic shock. When shocks are of the same sign, this will be the case for the high inflation country, if (Y is small or/and if eL, is small in absolute terms relative to ent. As long as shocks are of the same sign in the two countries, the country outside the ECB can take advantage of its small size relative to the fixed exchange rate zone. This will not be the case if shocks affecting countries are of opposite sign. This can be seen by deriving the expected welfare loss levels for both countries: where uHL is the covariance between en and eL. Hence, the expected welfare loss level of countries is increasing with the covariance of shocks and the variance of both shocks at home and abroad. This is because the inflation reaction to shocks needs not be as strong when shocks are not perfectly correlated and when the variance of shocks is low. If the covariance between shocks affecting the two sets of countries is low, the ability to take advantage of its relative size decreases for the outside country. The component of the welfare loss level for the high inflation country that depends on urn_ is increasing in LY as long as uHL is positive. In this sense the free-rider incentive decreases when shocks are not perfectly correlated. However, if the covariance of shocks is low, output and inflation will be more stable in all countries. In this sense, the inefficiency of a partial ECB will be decreased and the cooperative gains from creating an ECB for both the low and the high inflation countries will be decreased.
